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Abstract
This paper examines the input and output additionality of public R&D subsidies in
Western and Eastern Germany. We estimate the impact of public R&D grants on firms'
R&D and innovation input. Based on the results of this first step we compare the impact
of publicly funded private R&D on innovation output with the output effect of R&D
funded out of firms' own pockets. We employ microeconometric evaluation methods
using firm-level data derived from the Mannheim Innovation Panel. Our results point
toward a large degree of additionality in public R&D grants with regard to innovation
input measured as R&D expenditures and innovation expenditures, as well as with regard
to innovation output measured by patent applications. Input additionality has been more
pronounced in Eastern Germany during the transition period than in Western Germany.
However, R&D productivity is still larger for the established Western German innovation
system than for Eastern Germany. Hence, a regional redistribution of public R&D
subsidies might improve the overall innovation output of the German economy.
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1.  Introduction
Over the last couple of years the catching-up process of the former East Germany has not lived up to
its expected speed. Labour productivity is still significantly lower in Eastern Germany than in Western
Germany: unemployment is much higher and the value of regional production falls short of regional
consumption (cf., e.g., Burda and Hunt 2001). Hence, based on the convergence speed realised in the
first phase of the catching-up process, a significant transfer of income will be needed for a much
longer time period than expected. Neither the private nor the public sector in Eastern Germany will be
viable without a massive influx from the western parts of Germany.
In 2004, various critical reviews of the current means of stimulating the catching-up process have been
published, inducing a wide-ranging discussion on how to foster the transition of the former East
German regions. The German federal government’s 2004 (Bundesregierung 2004) report on the
“status of German unification” suggests a rapid expansion in manufacturing. According to the
government's view, the stagnant catch-up process has been primarily caused by the downturn of the
business cycle in the last three years. However, the report also suggests a revision of current policy
instruments. Based on an appraisal, the current situation and the perspectives for Eastern Germany, the
federal government’s high-level expert group also called for major revisions of policy approaches (cf.
Seitz 2004, Dohnani 2004). This group also raised the question of whether the low growth rates of the
western regions in the last ten tears was caused by the huge 4% regional product burden implied by
the financing of transfers to the eastern regions.
The emerging general consensus in economic policy holds that transfers should focus on investments
in innovation, research and development. Likewise industry associations as well as many firms
suggest additional public intervention, lamenting their limited financial resources and severe barriers
to acquiring bank loans. Without additional public subsidies for investment, innovation and R&D, the
private sector in Eastern Germany will not be able to profit from EU enlargement. Caught between
highly productive western European industries and low-wage industries in the new member states,
Eastern German firms face a dilemma and rapid productivity gains induced by increased investments
in physical and knowledge (R&D) capital seem to be the only way out. However, public subsidies for
those types of private investments have been at record levels in Eastern Germany for more than a
decade now and many doubt the effectiveness and efficiency of even larger subsidies (e.g.
DIW/IAB/IfW/IWH/ZEW 2003).
Against this background this paper examines the effectiveness and efficiency of public R&D grants for
private sector R&D projects. We restrict our analysis to programmes which involve a direct payment
to private firms. However, we do not intend to evaluate single programmes, looking instead at the
“average” impact of public R&D subsidies on private R&D. In addition, we examine both sides of the
link between R&D - publicly funded and funded by firms from their own pockets - and innovation
output. We use the relation between publicly funded R&D and innovation input and output in Western- 2 -
Germany as a benchmark for the impacts of R&D programme during the first ten years of the
transition process in Eastern Germany.
In Section 2 we introduce some basic facts about innovation and productivity growth in Eastern
Germany. In addition, we highlight some evidence of the credit market squeeze felt by firms from
Eastern Germany using Western Germany as a benchmark. Section 3 shortly introduces the method
used to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of public R&D subsidies, and Section 4 describes the
data used. In Section 5 we look at the impact of public R&D subsidies on private R&D and discuss
reasons for the divergences between Eastern Germany and Western Germany. Section 6 deals with the
impact of public subsidies on innovation output. Again, we highlight differences with regard to the
impact of R&D subsidies in both parts of Germany. We use the well-known concept of the knowledge
production function to derive measures for the efficiency of public subsidies concerning innovation
output. Finally, Section 7 summarises the results. In addition, taking the current policy discussion as a
standard, we discuss some implications of our econometric results.
2.  Innovation activities and R&D during the German transition
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Eastern Germany has drastically reduced the huge initial
productivity gap. Figure 1 demonstrates the development of the relative labour productivity level in
Eastern Germany for the total economy and manufacturing and business services. The figure shows
the Eastern German economy's initially rapid productivity recovery.
Figure 1:  Productivity level comparison of Eastern Germany relative to Western









































Annotation:  Eastern Germany comprises the new Länder (states) excluding Berlin. Berlin is also omitted from
the Western German data, because a separation of East Berlin and West Berlin is not possible.
Labour productivity is calculated as value-added in constant prices divided by number of
employees.
Source: Statistische Ämter der Länder (state statistical offices) (2005), Volkswirtschaftliche
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder (national accounts), Series 1, Volume 1.- 3 -
At the macro-level (“total economy”), a drastic slowdown in the speed of convergence is visible in
1995/1996. This deceleration is less pronounced in manufacturing as well as in the business service
and financial service sectors. The difference in development between the overall economy on the one
hand and manufacturing and business services on the other reflects the waning of the construction
industry-based growth seen in Eastern Germany in the first phase of the transition process.
The continued productivity recovery of Eastern German manufacturing has been fuelled by extensive
investment in new equipment, which has in turn been stimulated by generous government subsidies.
(cf. Hunt and Burda 2001). Thus, the catch-up process in manufacturing has been mainly driven by
increasing the stock of physical capital. Physical investment per employee and investment per unit of
output has at times been much higher in Eastern Germany than in Western Germany. In addition, an
extensive transfer of know-how and organisational innovation has taken place via the direct
investments of Western German and foreign companies (see Burda and Hunt 2001).
The catching-up process is also visible with respect to the international competitiveness of Eastern
German firms. The East's increasing export ratios even outperformed the success of Western German
firms in international markets. The compound growth rate of exports in the period from 1996 to 2002
amounted to 21% p.a. R&D-intensive industries took the lead with a 26% annual growth rate in
exports. This contributed to a significant 12% growth p.a. in R&D-intensive industries. However,
there is still a significant gap in export ratios compared to Western Germany. The exports to total sales
ratio amounts to 41% in Eastern Germany, whereas the ratio for Western German R&D-intensive
manufacturing approaches 55%. (cf. Legler et al. 2004 for details).
The reorganisation of the Eastern German economy was paralleled by an even stronger reorganisation
of the (regional) innovation system (see Meske 2000, Leydesdorff and Fritsch 2005). Just after
unification the number of industry R&D personnel dropped considerably. Still today, innovation
expenditures as well as R&D expenditures are much lower in Eastern Germany than in Western
Germany at the aggregated level. This is depicted in Figure 2.
Both R&D and innovation intensity
2 declined during the first transition phase, mainly due to the
rapidly rising added value but also due to the decreasing degree of R&D employment in
manufacturing witnessed up until 1993. Since the mid-1990s, R&D and innovation intensities have
increased and the significant gap between Eastern and Western Germany has only gradually reduced.
This is notable because the growth rates in manufacturing and business services, which contribute to
the bulk of R&D and innovation expenses, are larger in Eastern Germany than in Western Germany,
implying an even larger growth rate of R&D and innovation expenses.
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Figure 2:  R&D intensity and innovation intensity of the private sector in Eastern and
Western Germany
R&D Intensity = Internal R&D expenditures
relative to Added Value
(Private Sector)
Innovation Intensity = Innovation



































Source: Stifterverband; VGR der Länder Source: ZEW, VGR der Länder
Annotations: Eastern Germany includes Berlin Annotations: Eastern Germany includes Berlin; 1993-
1996 are partly estimated
Fostering the competitiveness of Eastern German firms by stimulating R&D and innovation was a
prime goal of the government's economic policy right from the start of the transition period. Various
programmes to stimulate private R&D were launched, driven by the conviction that Eastern German
firms would only survive in the market place if they were able to improve their technological
competitiveness. The weak technological base is still a common economic rationale for such
programmes. Another widespread sentiment is that the continual presence of credit squeeze hampers
investments in R&D. The numbers in Figure 2 support this widely held belief. However, it is well
known that R&D and innovation intensities vary considerably by firm size and industry. Taking the
structural features of the Eastern German economy into account, Legler et al. (2004) show that the
“adjusted” R&D intensity of the manufacturing sector in Eastern Germany is even higher than that of
Western Germany.
Data from the German innovation survey show that the share of manufacturing firms engaged in R&D
compared to all manufacturing firms is larger in Eastern Germany. 27% of Eastern German firms
performed R&D, whereas this share amounts only to 23% in Western Germany. As shown in Figure 3
the majority of R&D performers in Eastern Germany receive R&D subsidies, while only 30% of R&D
performers in the West take part in government-sponsored R&D programmes.- 5 -
Figure 3:  Share of firms performing continuous R&D with and without public R&D
subsidies



































































































Eastern Germany               Western Germany Eastern Germany             Western Germany
firms with subsidies
firms without subsidies
Annotation: Figures refer to firms with five or more employees
Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel
In addition, R&D intensity (measured as the share of R&D workers in total employment) in R&D
performing firms in manufacturing and business services is larger in Eastern Germany than in Western
Germany. Given this number, one immediately supposes that the high R&D intensity and the
widespread R&D participation of firms are due to the generous R&D support provided to Eastern
German firms. However, there seem to be some problems with regard to the efficiency of this huge
R&D investment. Legler et al. (2004) give some descriptive evidence showing that the ratio of new
product sales to innovation expenditures as well as patents to R&D spending are significantly smaller
for Eastern German manufacturing than for that of Western Germany. Against this background, the
present paper attempts more formal tests of the lower efficiency of R&D and innovation expenditures
in Eastern Germany. It adopts a double-testing strategy. We first look at the relationship between
publicly and privately funded R&D in manufacturing, and then compare the gradient of public
innovation support on innovation output in both regions.
3.  Methodological Approach
The common objective of public R&D support is to increase the size and number of R&D projects
performed by private-sector firms. This is especially true for the present R&D support system in
Germany which mainly comes as grants to specific projects. Tax credit-based R&D support is not
available. Theoretically, public support focuses on projects whose private cost-benefit ratios are small- 6 -
and will hence only be undertaken if public subsidies are available.
3 In order to keep allocation failure
at a minimum, the government will only cover a share of the total project cost (typically 50%). As a
consequence, public support is expected to induce additional private R&D investment because, due to
lower private costs, the private cost-benefit calculation exceeds the threshold value. This implies that
the project selection (by the government as well as by the firms) is far from random. Both the
government and firms are interested in conducting the best projects. However, firms maximise private
value, whereas the government is interested in maximising social value. Hence, a comparison of
sponsored and non-sponsored projects will not give a reliable indication of the impact of R&D
subsidies, particularly when we leave the project level and look at the firm level: Firms have an
incentive to re-allocate resources to R&D-related areas when public support is more likely. Looking at
firm-level R&D thus presents a stronger test of the (input) additionality of public R&D support than
the project level. Furthermore, firm-level tests of output additionality also take into account negative
impacts on R&D productivity resulting from the re-routing effect.
If we observe systematic differences between supported firms and non-supported firms, a pure
comparison of the mean impact of the subsidies may lead to biased results. A relevant question to ask
would be, for instance, “What is the amount of R&D the company would have spent without
subsidies?” The problem is that this situation – the counterfactual - is not directly observable. Hence,
in order to make a reliable guess regarding the programme's impact we have to look for methods
which facilitate the best possible inference of the counterfactual situation. In the 1980s several
econometric models were developed to estimate the counterfactual situation and thus estimate the
“treatment effect” in the case of a non-random selection of the group of treated firms.
4 For this
analysis we chose the matching estimator shortly illustrated in the following:
Step 1: Impact of R&D subsidies on R&D input
Our starting point is a question linking the target variable (Y) (e.g., private R&D investment) to the
policy instrument and a variety of other exogenous factors (X) which also influence the target variable
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As usual, ut represents a random variable. The impact of the respective policy instrument is measured
by a. D is a simple dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm is treated and 0 otherwise.
When employing matching estimators, there is no need to make assumptions about the functional form
of g
0 and g
1. This is a crucial advantage of the matching approach.
                                                     
3  In order to clarify our argument we neglect from capital market imperfections as a rationale for public
subsidies (see Hall 2002). See David et al. (2000) or Klette et al. (2000) for recent surveys on the evaluati-
on of R&D policies.
4  See Heckman et al. (1999), Blundell and Costa Dias (2000, 2002) for surveys.- 7 -
The basic idea of the matching approach is to imitate a “natural” experiment where the treatment is
randomly distributed between groups of identical twins. Hence, the goal of the matching approach is
to find for each treated firm (firms that receive public R&D subsidies) an “identical” non-treated firm.
In this case, “identity” means that the firms in each pair have sufficiently similar values with regard to
all of the variables summarised in X. Ideally, X contains all of the factors (variables) responsible for
participation in public R&D programmes. Depending on the complexity of the decision process,
perfect “twins” may be hard to find. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) developed an approach to solve the
"curse of dimensionality" in the twinning problem: the “propensity score matching”. Instead of using
all of the variables contained in X, we can use the estimated likelihood of programme participation
conditioned on X. The probability of participation P is modelled as a function of X. The twinning
process groups firms with a similar estimated probability of programme participation (“nearest
neighbour”). The propensity score is estimated by a probit regression. Based on Rubin’s (1977)
conditional independence assumption, the counterfactuals for the treated firms can be subsequently
estimated by the values of their nearest neighbours:
(2) () ( )
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where  ˆ β  represents the estimated coefficients of the probit model for programme participation. Based
on the estimated propensity score we find the “nearest neighbour” using the following procedure:
1.  Let {(1)} represent the treated firms, {(0)} the non-treated firms
2.  Randomly select a firm i from {(1)}.
3.  Find another firm j ∈{(0)} which is closest to i in terms of its propensity score P.
4.  Select firm j as a twin to i.
5.  Repeat steps 2 to 4 for all firms in {(1)}.
When this process is finished the average impact of the programme on the treated (Average Treatment
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1 represents the number of treated firms. In addition to the standard propensity score matching, we
assume that the firms are identical in a certain number of characteristics. We also stipulate that twins
stem from the same industry.
In the empirical analysis we use different measures of innovation input in order to increase the
robustness of our conclusions. Given the availability of the innovation survey data, we first explore the
impact of public R&D subsidies on R&D input. Secondly, we use the concept of innovation- 8 -
expenditures, which comprises R&D and other inputs needed to bring new products to the market
and/or use advanced production equipment.
5
Step 2: Impact of R&D subsidies and privately funded R&D on innovation output
The second step of our analysis attempts to ascertain whether there are productivity differences
between government-funded R&D and R&D funded out of firms' own pockets. This allows some
insight into questions of efficiency with regard to public R&D funding. The point of departure is a
typical Griliches invention production function linking innovation output to innovation input.
We assume that the innovation output of firm i (Oi) is a function of R&D input and a vector of the
control variable Z. The novel aspect of our approach is its separation of R&D expenditures into two
components. In Yi




 that is, in R&D that would have been carried out regardless of
public R&D subsidies (Yi




0 and ai were calculated as a result of the matching approach. Hence:
(4)  Oi = f(Yi
0
, ai,, Zi)
Comparing regression results found for Yi
0 and a provides some hints of whether there might be
differentials with regard to the productivity of both types of R&D. We restrict the second step to
patent applications as a measure for innovation output because patent applications are in close
temporal proximity to innovation input. Other innovation output indicators, e.g., share of sales with
innovative products and cost reductions due to new processes, are not employed here because it
usually takes some time until the impact of innovation materializes in such measures. As a
consequence, however, we may underestimate the impact of re-routing budgets.
4.  Data and Operationalisation
The data used in the analysis were taken from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
6, which has been
collected by the ZEW via mail survey since 1993. The survey encompasses data on R&D- and
innovation expenditures, a wide array of firm characteristics (e.g., firm age, industry, turnover, number
of employees, exports, firm integration, market structure) and information on whether or not the
respondent firms have received innovation support from public sources (e.g., the EU, the German
federal government, their respective state governments, public banks).
This pool of data is supplemented by information from the German Patent Office on each individual
firm’s patent applications. Depending on the information of public subsidies, four waves of the MIP
were used for this study, corresponding to the years 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000. In the following, the
indicators and values for the endogenous variables (publicly sponsored promotion, R&D and
                                                     
5 Innovation expenditures were used already by Czarnitzki (2001); R&D was used by Almus and Czarnitzki
(2003) in a similar context.
6 Janz et al. (2001) provide a detailed description of this database.- 9 -
innovation activities, and patent applications) as well as the exogenous variables are introduced. Basic
descriptive statistics on sample firms from Western and Eastern Germany and publicly supported and
non-supported firms can be found in Tables A1 to A4 in the appendix. In addition to definitions, this
section also cites economic rationale for the use of this set of endogenous variables
Public promotion of R&D
A central variable of this study is the firm support status indicator (PF), which takes the value 1 if the
firm in question received public research support either from the EU, the German federal government
or a German state in the observed year.
Expenditures for R&D and innovation
A firm’s total R&D expenditures are part of its innovation expenses regardless of their categorization
as internal or external. In addition to these expenditures, a logarithm of R&D expenditures is applied
as a dependent variable in order to compensate for the skewness in the distribution of R&D (lnR&D).
Moreover, R&D intensity is analysed as R&D / SALES * 100 . “Innovation expenditures” include (in
addition to R&D expenses) all continuous expenses, such as personnel and material expenditures
linked to innovation projects, as well as investments made in the development and introduction of new
and improved products and/or processes (cf. Eurostat and OECD, 1997). Innovation expenditures thus
contain R&D expenses as well as spending related to prototypes, product design, investment in the
manufacture of new and improved products, introduction of process innovations, market launch costs,
license acquisition and patent application expenditures, and further education of employees assigned
to innovation projects and similar expenses. The innovation expenditure logarithm (lnIE) and
innovation intensity (IE/SALES * 100) are also used.
Number of patent applications and propensity to patent
Patents are a common measure of innovation output (cf. Griliches 1990 for a survey). The most
important advantages of this indicator are its ready availability and comparatively high
standardization. Additionally, a patent application is temporally closely associated with the R&D
process and hence poses fewer assignment problems between R&D input and output than alternative
indicators. The main disadvantage of using patent applications lies in the fact that many patents have
only a negligible economic value. Typically, the value of patents varies dramatically (cf. Hall 2000
and Hall et al., 2005 for overviews);not all companies patent their inventions, relying instead on other
mechanisms to protect their intellectual property (e.g., non-disclosure). Despite this caveat, this study
uses two patent-based measures. The dummy variable DPATit indicates whether a firm applied for at
least one patent in a given year, taking the value 1 if so and zero otherwise. The second measure used
is number of annual patent applications PATit.
Firm size
Increased R&D promotion in the former East German states is in many cases justified by citing the
small-business structure of the firms implementing R&D. The related literature presents diverse- 10 -
discussions on the correlation between firm size and R&D or innovation activities. Arguments in
favour of the theory that larger firms are more eager to innovate are also manifold (cf. Cohen 1995 for
an overview), extending from improved capital market access and economies of scale and scope to
complementarities in implementing innovation marketing. Firm size is considered in terms of number
of employees (EMP) and is used in logarithmic form (lnEMP). Additionally, (lnEMP)² is used to
capture possible non-log-linear functional forms.
Herfindahl index of firm concentration
Market structure is traditionally regarded in industrial economic studies as an important determinant of
innovation activity. As a rule, one would expect higher profits in highly concentrated markets. The
likelihood of state support may also be increased, since fewer companies compete for available
resources. Market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index for turnover at a three-digit
industry level corresponding to the NACE classification (lnHHI).
Firm age
Firm age is introduced to capture specific funds available to young firms and these firms' particular
needs. As a rule, one refers to young firms’ poor access to the capital market and lack of their own
financial capacity. Firm age is thus a potentially essential determinant of innovation activity, but also
of the probability of participation in public support programmes. The firm age (in years) in logs
(lnAGE) is applied in the regressions.
Export activity
One can assume that firms committed to being internationally competitive have a higher propensity to
innovate than others. It is also accepted that expansion of innovation expenditures has mainly occurred
in more export-oriented branches in recent years. In response, firms’ export activity is measured in the
estimations using a dummy variable DEXPit, which takes the value 1 when exports were recorded for
the respective firm and zero otherwise.
Patent stock (previously accumulated patents)
Patent stock approximates firms’ past innovation activity and depicts both previously collected
knowledge and otherwise disregarded qualities of innovation. The variable patent stock ( PSit)
corresponds to firm i’s number of patent applications (PAit) in year t and patent stock in the previous
year t-1, the latter of which is inserted into the patent stock calculation in year t with an “depreciation
factor” of 15 percent. This deduction accounts for loss and economic obsolescence of knowledge
7:
1 0.85* it it it PSP S P A − =+
The patent information utilized is taken from the DPMA (German Patent and Trademark Office)
database and contains data from 1980 on. Patent stocks (PS) are calculated for each individual firm
                                                     
7  Cf. Griliches and Mairesse (1984) or Hall (1990) for further details.- 11 -
and are then linked to the MIP firm data. For the year 1979 all firms’ PS values are set to zero.
Depreciating the knowledge stocks over time guarantees that the distortion caused by the initial
condition of zero is negligible in the period under review. In the regression analyses the patent stock
enters with a one-year lag, thereby avoiding endogeneity. This variable is also measured in logs. In
cases where the patent stock is zero it is replaced by the smallest positive value observed in the
sample. In order to compensate for the resulting distortion, an additional dummy variable NoPAT is
introduced, indicating zero patents.
R&D department
An experienced work force, accumulated knowledge and modern capital equipment are important
factors in carrying out innovation projects. Established organisational structures simplify the
bureaucratic investment typically implied by such ventures. Furthermore, one can also suppose that
R&D facilities promote participation in government programmes because of superior information
about government programmes. R&D departments are natural contact points for scientific institutions
looking for partners for collaborative research projects funded by the government. In applying for
R&D support R&D facilities can fall back on readily available experience, allowing R&D employees
to handle the application with relatively little effort. A dummy variable (RDDEPTit) indicates whether
a firm has its own R&D department.
Credit rating / access to the capital market
As data from innovation surveys show, high costs of innovation, the significant economic risks
involved and a lack of sources of financing rank are among the dominant obstacles to innovation. Lack
of financial resources is considered an “innovation barrier” by medium-sized industrial firms in
particular. A number of studies (cf., e.g., Toivanen/Niinnen, 2000, Czarnitzki, 2002) provide evidence
that restrictions on credit financing of research and development have an immediate effect on firms'
R&D intensity. In order to verify capital market restrictions, the CREDITREFORM credit rating index
(CR) – used by suppliers, banks, insurance companies, etc., in determining risks involved with clients
– is employed. This index can take values between 100 and 600 risk points. The higher the credit
rating index, the greater the risk. Firms with up to 130 risk points exhibit an excellent rating, while
values of 500 and above strongly suggest avoiding any business relationship.
Firm ownership
Holemans and Sleuwaegen (1988) and Janssens and Suetens (2001) point out that technology transfers
within company groups represent crucial determinants of the individual member-firms’ respective
R&D activities. The corresponding literature offers descriptions of widely varying effect channels and
–mechanisms displaying no uniformity with respect to the direction of that effect. The innovation
efficiency of Eastern German firms in particular may indeed benefit from membership in such
associations (cf. Czarnitzki, 2005). Along these lines, two dummy variables are applied: a binary
variable, taking the value 1 when the firm in question belongs to a Western German firm association
(WGROUPit), and another which takes the value 1 when the parent company of the firm in question is- 12 -
based abroad (FOREIGNit). In addition, one should bear in mind that these variables also portray
access restraints to public research support. Small firms, for example, do not qualify for support
programmes meant to encourage SMEs if they are majority-owned by large firms.
Specific industry- and year effects
Additionally, we capture industry-specific impacts and year-specific effects by including industry and
time dummies in all of the regressions. Porter (1998), for example, identifies with his diamond-scheme
the components market conditions, demand conditions, related and auxiliary industries and firm
strategies as the four main determinants of a nation’s competitive advantage. Industry particularities
not covered by the other variables are hence accounted for with sector dummies. Changes in the
general macroeconomic framework can also have an effect on firms’ innovation activity. For instance,
a recession can present challenges to parties seeking sufficient capital for R&D projects; changes in
the capital market can lead to postponements in firms’ investment opportunities as they readjust their
resource allocations. In order to control for these and many other possible temporal influences in the
regressions, four year dummies are included in all the analyses.
5.  Impact of Public R&D Subsidies on Innovation Input
A number of scenarios arise in the empirical analysis. As Czarnitzki (2002) describes, the existence of
government funding can engender two different reactions. When such promotion has a stimulating
effect on innovation input, one wonders what course the affected firms would have taken had they not
received any assistance. On the one hand, the firms’ levels of R&D expenditures, for example, might
have been lower without support. On the other hand, however, small and medium-sized companies in
particular may not have been able to engage in any R&D at all without government subsidies. Eastern
German firms would have also abandoned R&D efforts after encountering capital market restrictions.
These considerations give rise to two options:
•  The initial estimation contains in the potential control group all non-supported firms, regardless of
whether they are engaged in R&D or not; this will allow for firms changing their R&D status.
•  In the second estimation the control group is limited to firms permanently conducting R&D. This
likely underestimates the effect of promotion, as it is assumed implicitly that R&D promotion alone
is not able to motivate firms to start R&D activities.
Case I: Government-funded R&D performers vs. all other firms
Programme participation and differences between supported and non-supported firms
The effect of innovation promotion on innovation input (R&D- and innovation expenditures) is
examined first. The probability of participation in government-funded R&D programmes (PF) is
estimated using a probit model (cf. Table 1). This allows for some interesting insights into differences
between Eastern and Western Germany. Using firms’ patent stocks as a measure of earlier innovation- 13 -
success is an essential determinant of receiving financial support. A clear indicator of a firm’s access
to R&D capacity or its actual engagement in R&D (an R&D department) is presented by innovation
successes, which are documented via preceding patent applications. Conversely, only a small share of
Eastern German firms can claim to have innovated successfully using patents; as a result, a problem
concerning orientation on innovation history is posed to the promoting entity. As in the Western
German states, support programmes in the “new” states have focused on the dispersal of firms’
knowledge bases. This is made apparent by the fact that the existence of one’s own R&D department –
not recorded by the patent stock – is decisive in predicting likelihood of receiving public support, a
conclusion that could also reflect the contrasting political devices affecting research and technology in
the two regions. While Western Germany focuses on direct promotion of specific R&D projects, the
East emphasises an indirect approach (e.g., fostering R&D personnel).
In essence, the estimation of participation likelihood in Eastern Germany resulted in a specification
dependent on firm size, the R&D-department dummy, the NoPAT dummy (indicating whether a firm
had never applied for a patent), firm age, export activity and firm integration. Market structure,
measured as lnHHI, credit rating (lnCR) and size of patent stock had no influence on participation in
support programmes in Eastern Germany and were thus not considered in the final estimation (see
Table 1).
As expected, firm size is a significant determinant of public R&D subsidies. In addition, an existing
R&D department is one of the most important determinants of support in Eastern Germany. Firms
with own R&D departments demonstrate the capacity and competency to successfully carry out R&D
projects.
Likelihood of participation declines in Eastern Germany as firm age increases, while in Western
Germany firm age has no such influence. This effect may reflect the existence of support programmes
for young high-tech firms; the application behaviour of firms can potentially change over time as well.
Older firms have better funding alternatives, as external investors can more often rely on the
experience of such companies than with newly founded firms. As a consequence, established
companies able to provide evidence of a successful record have better access to the capital market.
Firms engaged in international competition take part in support programmes more often than other
firms. This may also represent a signalling effect. Through their established position on international
markets these firms have apparently proven their ability to transform innovation activities into
successful products.- 14 -
Table 1: Probit Regression for Programme Participation; All Firms
Dependent Variable: PF Eastern Germany Western Germany
Exogenous variable Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error
lnEMP 0.94
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incl. industry and year dummies
Log-likelihood -863.98 -1,533.92
McFadden Pseudo R² 0.337 0.165
Number of observations 1,967 4,495
*** (**, *) denotes significance at the of 1% (5%, 10%) level
Members of a Western German (in the case of Eastern German companies) or foreign company group
receive public support less frequently. This may be due to parent companies’ centralised R&D. In this
case, subsidiaries do not submit applications for public innovation assistance. On the other hand,
effects of entry requirements for promotion designed to be limited for subsidiaries are reflected in
these variables.
Credit rating (measured by the rating CR) and market structure (lnHHI) also play a role in the Western
German states. When one considers patent stocks in the West, R&D departments offer no additional
explanatory power to the estimation of participation likelihood.
As one can deduce from Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix, a clear divergence is shown between both
the Western and Eastern German states on the one hand and supported and non-supported firms on the
other. Supported firms are larger on average, have an R&D department, are more likely to have
applied for a patent in the past and are exporters. Particularly striking in the West are the differences in
firm size: Supported companies employ an average of 652 individuals, decidedly more than non-
supported firms’ average of 260. As expected, the measures of innovation, R&D and innovative
projects, are higher in supported firms. It does bear mentioning that the significant differences in the
determinants of probability of public funding between the two groups indicate a definite selection bias.
The estimated (unbounded) propensity score in particular differs sharply, amounting to 0.42 for
supported firms and -0.93 for those not supported in the East. Similar deviations of -0.72 and -1.38,
respectively, are also evident in Western Germany.- 15 -
Impact of public R&D funds – comparing promoted firms with the control group
In order to avoid a bias due to self-selection, nearest-neighbour matching is applied in the following as
described in Section 3. For the 735 (638) beneficiaries from Eastern Germany (Western Germany) the
most similar firm is selected from the control group, followed by a comparison of the criteria’s mean
values. If no significant difference is found in the determinants of support -- particularly in propensity
score -- the remaining differences in the target variable (R&D- and innovation expenditures) can be
traced back to public support. The mean comparison of the exogenous variables serves here as a
“quality check” of the matching procedure. If the differences disappear after the matching, the process
is considered successful. However, if significant mean differences remain, the groups are not yet
comparable; an additional criterion may need to be added to the matching function or further
restrictions applied.
Table 2: Mean Comparison after Matching; Entire Sample
Eastern Germany Western Germany
Supported firms Selected control group Supported firms Selected control group
Number of


















EMP 157.64 11.570 144.19 6.628 634.45 33.590 584.69 29.992
1nPat / / -6.27 0.150 -6.40 0.147
NoPat 0.64 0.018 0.67 0.017 0.29 0.018 0.29 0.018
RDDEPT. 0.68 0.017 0.64 0.018 / /
AGE 7.02 0.134 6.78 0.175 / /
DEXP 0.78 0.015 0.79 0.015 0.97 0.007 0.97 0.007
WGROUP 0.19 0.014 0.21 0.015 / /
FOREIGN 0.05 0.008 0.05 0.008 0.11 0.013 0.11 0.013
1nHHI / / 3.30 0.049 3.31 0.053
1nCR / / 5.27 0.011 5.28 0.011
Propensity score 0.41 0.033 0.37 0.031 -0.72 0.021 -0.73 0.021
R&D 0.76 0.116 0.31
*** 0.037 4.21 0.707 1.95
*** 0.196
lnR&D -1.84 0.066 -5.20
*** 0.163 -0.35 0.077 -3.23
*** 0.200
R&D/SALES * 100 6.40 0.386 2.25
*** 0.191 4.38 0.244 2.22
*** 0.131
D(R&D>0) 1.00 0.000 0.67
*** 0.017 1.00 0.000 0.73
*** 0.018
lnIE -1.10 0.061 -4.05
*** 0.169 0.25 0.072 -2.11
*** 0.193
IE/SALES * 100 10.82 0.500 5.50
*** 0.424 6.39 0.283 3.89
*** 0.197
*** (**, *) denotes a significant mean difference in a two-sided t-test at the levely of 1% (5%, 10%). The distribution of
observations across industries is identical after the matching.
In the matching, the non-supported firm with the closest propensity score is selected for each
supported enterprise. In doing so, however, certain conditions must be met: The chosen twin must
belong to the same industry as the promoted firm and its observation must originate from the same or
immediately previous year. The possibility that twins can stem from the period t-1 allows a firm to
serve as its own control observation if its support status changes from “no” to “yes”. This is a
preferable case; both observations are most likely equal in non-observed criteria such as management
quality.- 16 -
As Table 2 demonstrates, the differences between the selected pairs disappear after the matching.
However, the differences in the target variables remain significantly different from zero. Supported
Eastern German (Western German) firms thus exhibit an R&D intensity of 6.4% (4.4%) on average,
compared to an average of 2.25% (2.2%) in the absence of promotion. Additionally, one must consider
that all of the supported firms are engaged in R&D, compared to just 67% of the control observations.
According to this calculation, one-third of the beneficiary companies would not have been involved in
R&D if they had not received support.
Case II: Supported Firms vs. Firms Permanently Performing R&D
If one restricts the control group to firms engaged in R&D, similar results appear in the estimation of
participation likelihood. Still, in the case of Eastern Germany the export dummy continues to be
insignificant. The same effects seen in the comparison of supported firms and firms in general are
apparent in the remaining determinants. Overall, however, the explanatory power of the regressions
with respect to participation in support programmes is noticeably diminished when comparing
supported firms to firms permanently performing R&D.
Significant differences also appear before the matching (cp. appendix Tables A3 and A4).
Interestingly, average firm size in the two groups is no longer dissimilar in Eastern Germany when
firms active in R&D are observed.
Table 3: Probit Regression for Programme Participation; R&D-performing Firms Only
Dependent Variable: PF Eastern Germany Western Germany
Exogenous variable Coeff. Std. error Coeff. Std. error
lnEMP 0.67





















lnHHI /0 . 0 5
* 0.031
lnCR /0 . 3 0
** 0.117
Constants -0.24 1.124 -3.00
*** 0.791
incl.industry and year dummies
Log-likelihood -505.69 -1294.14
Pseudo R² 0.1291 0.07
Number of observations 1,008 2,401
*** (**, *) denotes an error probability of 1% (5%, 10%).
However, only 265 control observations (non-supported firms) are available for the 726 supported,
permanent R&D performers from Eastern Germany. From one perspective this presents a problem for- 17 -
the analysis; the pool of potential control observations is relatively small. This problem can be solved
by making repeated allocations of individual control observations to support cases. On the other hand,
this still indicates that R&D status in Eastern Germany is also susceptible to public R&D support. A
considerable number of the firms not receiving support also choose not to engage in R&D. In other
words, the vast majority of R&D-active companies in Eastern Germany receive some form of public
promotion (cf. Figure 3). The marginal amount of control observations available in the Eastern
German states is also responsible for the lack of an appropriate matching partner for approximately
every eighth supported firm. The effect of the “loss” of observations may yet remain limited; R&D
intensity of the non-observed firms differentiates only slightly from that of the firms included in the
estimation. This results in – if anything at all – a slight underestimation of the effect of support.
Sufficient control observations are available in Western Germany to prevent these problems from
arising.
Table 4: Comparison of Mean Values after Matching; R&D-performing Firms Only
Eastern Germany Western Germany
Supported Firms Selected Control Group Supported Firms Selected Control Group
Number of








EMP 135.32 7.558 149.60 7.661 629.34 32.830 592.64 30.316
1nPat / / -6.24 0.150 -6.40 0.145
NoPat 0.69 0.018 0.67 0.019 9.29 0.018 0.29 0.018
RDDEPT. 0.66 0.019 0.66 0.019 / /
AGE 6.99 0.120 7.21 0.297 / /
DEXP 0.77 0.017 0.77 0.167 0.97 0.007 0.97 0.007
WGROUP 0.21 0.016 0.20 0.016 / /
FOREIGN 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.11 0.013 0.11 0.013
lnHHI / / 3.30 0.049 3.29 0.052
lnCR / / 5.27 0.011 5.28 0.011
Propensity score 0.84 0.020 0.81 0.020 -0.49 0.015 -0.50 0.015
R&D 0.65 0.113 0.47 0.053 4.20 0.708 1.91
*** 0.186
lnR&D -1.95 0.070 -2.56
*** 0.077 -0.35 0.077 -0.35
*** 0.735
R&D/SALES * 100 6.24 0.416 3.13
*** 0.163 4.37 0.245 2.75
*** 0.138
lnIE -1.21 0.065 -1.62
*** 0.070 0.26 0.072 -0.06
*** 0.067
IE/SALES * 100 10.64 0.538 6.60
*** 0.375 6.37 0.282 4.83
*** 0.221
*** (**, *) denotes a significant mean value difference in a two-sided t-test with an error probability of 1% (5%, 10%). The
distribution of observations across branches is identical after the matching.
The matching results for the sample of R&D-performing firms are presented in Table 4. Promoted
firms exhibit a mean value of €650,000 (€4.2 million in Western Germany). If the same firms had not
received government support, they would have expended an average of just €470,000 (€1.9 million in
the West). The mean of R&D expenditures is actually no longer significantly different from zero, but
this can be attributed to asymmetry in the distribution of these expenditures. If this variable is
transformed into logarithms or an intensity value, a t-test also produces significant differences.
Alternatively, one can perform a test on median differences which is robust against skewness. This- 18 -
also results in a significant difference of medians: At the median, the supported firms spent €153,000
on R&D, compared to the control group’s €77,000. In the absence of government support, R&D
intensity would have amounted to an average of 4.7% (2.8% in Western Germany) instead of 6.5%
(4.4%); similarly, innovation intensity would have shifted from 10.6% (6.4%) to 6.6% (4.8%, cp.
Table 4).
Summary of Input Addionality Effects
The results with regard to input additionality are summarized in Figure 4. Differences between the two
sets of comparison groups are interpretable in that R&D promotion not only affects firms’ levels of
R&D expenditures: It should be recognized that such support can even stimulate the decision to
initially incorporate R&D operations. The disparities indicated by Figure 4 are all statistically
significant. Both R&D intensity and innovation intensity are markedly higher for supported firms
compared to those not receiving funding. Additionally, one can ascertain that these differences are
much more pronounced in the Eastern German states than in the West. This is traceable to both higher
support levels and stronger impacts of R&D promotion in Eastern Germany. This question cannot be
pursued further, however, as no information on levels of promotion is currently available in the data
set.






























Source: Mannheim Innovation Panel; own calculations (based on Tables 2 and 4).
When restricted to R&D-performing firms, the supported Eastern German firms’ mean R&D intensity
weighs in at 6.5%, compared to 3.3% in the comparison group. Innovation intensity reveals similar
differences, 10.6% for supported and 6.6% for non-supported firms. Of course, the fact that only 265
control observations are available for the 726 supported, R&D-active firms should be recalled. This
clearly allows us to conclude that R&D status in Eastern Germany relies heavily on government
funding. The bulk of the companies not receiving public R&D support are not engaged in R&D. When
the comparison between firms with R&D support and those (still innovating) firms without support is- 19 -
applied, the discrepancies are brought into starker relief; indeed, in this case the stimulating effect of
promotion on initial implementations of R&D is also added into the model. The comparison group’s
R&D intensity then only amounts to approximately 2.3%. According to this estimation, only 33% of
the supported firms would have been involved in research and development had they not received
funding.
6.  Effects of R&D Subsidies on Innovation Output
The input analyses show that R&D subsidies affect R&D spending positively in both Eastern and
Western Germany. Recipient firms invest significantly more in R&D compared to the counterfactual
situation where no subsidies were in place. However, it is questionable whether this additional
innovation input induced by public policy also improves innovation results. It may be possible that
subsidized projects are more risky undertakings than purely privately financed ones because it is more
difficult to find private investors willing to support such research plans. The subsidies could also be
spent inefficiently and therefore not lead to an increased output. Increases in the wages of R&D
personnel without a corresponding productivity gain is an example. Finally, the subsidies could re-
route a firm’s R&D portfolio towards technologies through which the firm is less productive in
generating innovation output.
Patent indicators are a suitable measure for an output analysis. Patent applications are closer in time to
the conducted R&D projects than sales with newly developed products or cost reductions due to the
implementation of new processes in production, for instance. One disadvantage is that the actual
economic value of patents may be very heterogenous. In this paper, we implicitly have to assume that
the filed patents from non-subsidized firms are not more valuable than those filed by subsidized firms
and vice versa. In other words, it is assumed that there is no significant correlation between the
average value of a patent and the respective subsidy.
Table 5 shows the regression results of a probit model representing the propensity to patent and of a
negative binomial model of patent counts for both Eastern and Western Germany.
8 In order to test for
a possible lower efficiency of publicly financed R&D expenditures, we employ the concept of
knowledge production functions (cf. Griliches 1990). R&D is assumed to be the most important input
for the production of patents (cf. Licht and Zoz, 1998, for estimations of knowledge production
functions for Germany). Industry dummies and time dummies control for different technological
opportunities and appropriability conditions. As shown in Chapter 3, we separate R&D expenditure
into two components Yi
0 and ai = Yi
1
 - Yi
0, R&D expenditures which would have been spent if no
subsidies were in place (Yi
0), and in those expenditures that were induced by public funding ai. The
values of Yi
0 and ai are derived from the previously shown matching estimations.
                                                     
8  Unfortunately, the data from the year 2000 cannot be used in these estimations because our patent database
does not include information beyond the year 1999.- 20 -
Table 5: Regressions on the patenting activity of publicly funded firms
Eastern Germany Western Germany
Number of observations: 497 491
Probit regression; dependent variable: patent application dummy
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.












Industry dummies; test on joint significance c
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** c
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Time dummies; test on joint significance c






Negative binomial regression, dependent variable: number of patent applications
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Time dummies; test on joint significance c
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*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
The probit regressions on the probability of having applied for at least for one patent show that the
coefficient of the non-subsidized R&D expenditures is about 0.45 in Eastern Germany and about 0.18
in Western Germany. The coefficient of publicly induced R&D is only 0.32 in Eastern Germany and
0.15 in Western Germany. Thus, the publicly funded R&D achieves a productivity amounting to about
71% (=0.32/0.45) of the non-subsidized R&D in Eastern Germany and about 83% (= 0.15/0.18) in
Western Germany. Although smaller then purely privately financed R&D, the effects of subsidies are
significantly positive on the output side of the innovation process. Under the assumption that firms
conduct projects with the highest expected returns even without subsidies in place - and start those
with lower expected returns due to the receipt of subsidies - this result is in accordance with the
paradigm of decreasing marginal returns on R&D activities.
If the number of filed patent applications is considered rather than the propensity to patent, we find a
similar result: The productivity of publicly funded R&D with respect to patents reaches 86% of the
productivity of privately financed R&D in Eastern Germany (75% in Western Germany). The
coefficient of publicly induced R&D is significantly different from zero in this case as well.
However, it should be pointed out that the difference in patent productivity between both kinds of
R&D is only statistically significant in the count data model for Western Germany (at the 5%
significance level). For the other cases, the hypothesis that both kinds of R&D are equally productive
is not rejected.- 21 -
In order to compare average patent productivity, one can calculate marginal effects based on the
coefficient estimates. For instance, based on the count data model of number of patent applications,
one would address the question "How does the average number of patents change if R&D activity
changes?" The marginal effects of publicly induced R&D are 0.22 (0.49) in Eastern (Western)
Germany. Those of privately financed R&D are 0.26 (0.64) in Eastern (Western) Germany. All values
are calculated at the sample means of the corresponding R&D variable. Thus, R&D in Eastern
Germany is not (yet) as productive as in Western German firms. Eastern German firms achieve
roughly 41% of the Western German R&D productivity level with respect to patents in the case of
non-subsidized activity (45% in case of subsidized R&D). However, this difference does not stem
from the high levels of subsidies in Eastern Germany: Productivity is lower for both subsidized and
non-subsidized R&D in the region.
Export intensity is entered into the patent production function for two reasons. Exporters often have a
higher productivity which may also be present in the invention process. In addition, exporters may
have a higher propensity to seek patent protection in order to increase their competitive position in
more highly contested foreign markets. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that export activity is an
important motivation for Western German firms to apply for patent protection but does not yet
influence patent behaviour in Eastern Germany. One reason for this may be that Eastern German firms
view even the Western German market as a “foreign” market. However, a more stringent explanation
needs a more complete analysis of differences in patenting behaviour in Eastern and Western Germany
(cf. Legler et al. 2004) and is left for further research.
7.  Synopsis and Interpretation of Results
The preceding sections first investigate whether governmental support of innovations, particularly
R&D, stimulates innovation input – measured by R&D expenditures of Eastern German firms – or if
these funds merely take the place of private resources. Secondly, tests are conducted to determine
whether additional, government-induced R&D expenditures have a positive effect on innovation
output, which is measured by firms’ patent activity. Analyses of innovation support of Western and
Eastern German firms are then compared accordingly.
The econometric analyses demonstrate the presence of selection biases in receiving public R&D funds.
Supported firms differ considerably from those not receiving aid: The former are larger on average,
more likely to feature an R&D department, more likely to have already applied for at least one patent,
and are also more likely to be internationally active. Thus, econometric methods that account for this
sort of selection bias must be applied.
Estimating probability of participation in R&D support programmes shows significant discrepancies
between the East and West. In Western Germany, support participation indicates a strong selection in
favour of firms that already have a history of above-average amounts of innovation activity. The
patent stocks of firms as a measure of past innovative success are an important determinant of- 22 -
receiving financial aid. A clear signal of a firm’s access to R&D capacities or engagement in R&D
(i.e., an R&D department) is actually secondary to proven success in innovation. In Eastern Germany,
however, only a small amount of firms are able to show a past success record in the form of patents.
Government promotion is spread out across a wider basis in the East; evidence of the ability to carry
out R&D is enough to be eligible for public R&D support. This finding may reflect the different
policy instruments in place in both parts of Germany. While technology-specific project grants are the
predominant means of R&D policy, Eastern German can also access less technology-specific R&D
support and specific support for R&D labour costs.
The implementation of the econometric processes reveals positive treatment effects; that is, public
funds do not substitute for firms’ own resources – they stimulate innovation input. At the same time,
the estimated treatment effects are more pronounced in Eastern Germany than in the West. This allows
one to conclude that - compared to their Western counterparts - Eastern German firms are not as
capable of acquiring capital from other financial channels. The estimations also indicate that a
significant share of Eastern German firms would not be engaged in R&D without public support. This
may hint at limited access to alternative sources of funding in Eastern Germany.
The aforementioned differences in the input analysis are statistically highly significant. Both R&D-
and innovation intensity are considerably higher in firms receiving public R&D grants. These
contrasts are also much more distinct in the Eastern states. This may be due both to the East’s greater
share of supported firms and a stronger stimulation effect of R&D promotion.
An analysis of firms’ patent activities shows that they are affected positively by support-induced R&D
in both German regions. Likelihood of having applied for at least one patent and number of patent
applications are also analysed. With regard to both dimensions we find only little evidence that
government-induced R&D is less productive than R&D solely financed out of firms' own pockets.
Only in the case of Western Germany we do find a significant, lower productivity for publicly
financed R&D. The difference in marginal productivity is less noticeable in Eastern Germany. Since
Western German firms still engage in a substantial amount of R&D without government funding –
allowing their average volume of R&D to be accordingly greater in comparison to Eastern German
firms – the effects of promotion in Western Germany are less marked. In the East, however, publicly
financed private R&D constitutes an essential component of total R&D and is thereby essential for
innovation output.
In the light of the current discourse on future innovation policy in Eastern Germany, our findings shed
a far more positive light on the role of R&D in the transition process than the dismal tones favoured by
some contemporaries. R&D promotion has made a crucial contribution to R&D intensification in the
Eastern German manufacturing industry. In the absence of public innovation promotion fewer firms
would have been able to implement new products and processes in national and international markets.
In this respect, there are considerable arguments for continuing such support.- 23 -
On the other hand, the results also show that the findings on R&D input in the East leave something to
be desired. Western German firms are able to realize a higher level of productivity with their R&D
resources. Even though the differences between firms’ publicly financed R&D expenditures and those
privately funded are clearly greater in the West, patent productivity of supported R&D in Western
Germany is still higher than firm-financed R&D in the East. However, this also implies that promotion
of R&D activities in Western Germany yields higher returns in the form of patents than it does in the
Eastern states. Assuming that additional R&D activity also improves international competitiveness and
thus creates more export opportunities, one could consider reallocating public R&D funds from the
East to the West to possibly realise a higher rate of growth, instead of using these resources to
stimulate the adjustment process in Eastern Germany. Similarly, the warnings concerning the West-
East transfer’s growth-impairing effect cannot be fully dismissed outright. However, the overall
picture more likely indicates additional public R&D instead of increasing R&D support in Western
Germany at the expense of the Eastern German innovation system, which is still in transition.- 24 -
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Appendix
Table A1: Mean Value Comparison before Matching – Eastern Germany, Entire Sample
Supported firms Potential control group
Number of observations 735 1224
Variable Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
EMP 157,62 11,510 94,97
*** 5,714
NoPat 0,64 0,018 0,86
*** 0,010
RDDEPT 0,68 0,017 0,15
*** 0,010
AGE 7,02 0,134 10,05
*** 0,421
DEXP 0,79 0,015 0,46
*** 0,014
WGROUP 0,19 0,014 0,17 0,011
FOREIGN 0,05 0,008 0,04 0,006
Propensity score 0,42 0,033 -0,93
*** 0,022
R&D 0,76 0,116 0,08
*** 0,017
lnR&D -1,83 0,066 -9,31
*** 0,100
R&D / SALES * 100 6,42 0,385 0,56
*** 0,696
D(R&D>0) 1,00 0,000 0,22
*** 0,012
lnIE -1,10 0,613 -8,26
*** 0,128
IE / SALES * 100 10,85 0,500 2,53
*** 0,246
*** (**, *) denote a significant mean difference in a two-sided t-test at the level of 1% (5%, 10%). The distribution
of observations across industries varies before the matching.
Tabelle A2: Mean Value Comparison before Matching – Western Germany, Entire Sample
Supported firms Potential control group
Number of observations 638 3.856
Variable Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
EMP 652.11 34.067 259.95
*** 7.671
lnPAT -6.26 0.148 -8.97
*** 0.060
NoPat 0.29 0.018 0.62
*** 0.008
DEXP 0.97 0.007 0.79
*** 0.007
FOREIGN 0.12 0.013 0.10
* 0.005
lnHHI 3.31 0.049 3.00
*** 0.019
lnCR 5.28 0.011 5.31
*** 0.004
Propensity score -0.72 0.021 -1.38
*** 0.010
R&D 4.29 0.701 0.54
*** 0.040
lnR&D -0.33 0.076 -6.68
*** 0.080
R&D / SALES * 100 4.35 0.241 1.11
*** 0.042
D(R&D>0) 1.00 0.000 0.46
*** 0.008
lnIE 0.28 0.072 -5.41
*** 0.086
IE / SALES * 100 6.38 0.280 2.60
*** 0.083
*** (**, *) denote a significant mean difference in a two-sided t-test at the level of 1% (5%, 10%). The distribution
of observations across industries varies before the matching.- 27 -
Table A3: Mean Value Comparison before Matching – Eastern Germany (R&D-performers)
Supported firms Potential control group
Number of observations 726 265
Variable Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
EMP 143.61 7.741 146.61 14.175
NoPat 0.64 0.018 0.81
*** 0.024
RDDEPT 0.68 0.017 0.50
*** 0.031
AGE 7.04 0.135 9.74
** 0.886
DEXP 0.78 0.015 0.68
** 0.029
WGROUP 0.19 0.015 0.22 0.026
FOREIGN 0.05 0.008 0.09
** 0.018
Propensity score 0.85 0.019 0.37
*** 0.033
R&D 0.65 0.100 0.37
** 0.076
LnR&D -1.87 0.065 -2.87
*** 0.122
R&D / SALES * 100 6.35 0.388 2.60
*** 0.289
lnIE -1.13 0.060 -1.75
*** 0.120
IE / SALES * 100 10.76 0.504 6.42
*** 0.582
*** (**, *) denote a significant mean difference in a two-sided t-test at the level of 1% (5%, 10%). The distribution of
observations across industries varies before the matching.
Table A4: Mean Value Comparison before Matching – Western Germany (R&D-performers)
Supported firms Potential control group
Number of observations 637 1,762
Variable Mean Std. error Mean Std. error
EMP 645.44 33.460 376.83
*** 13.459
lnPAT -6.26 0.148 -7.44
*** 0.093
NoPAT 0.29 0.018 0.42
*** 0.012
DEXP 0.97 0.007 0.91
*** 0.007
FOREIGN 0.12 0.013 0.13 0.008
lnHHI 3.31 0.049 3.08
*** 0.030
lnCR 5.28 0.011 5.27
*** 0.006
Propensity score -0.49 0.016 -0.74
*** 0.009
R&D 4.28 0.702 1.18
*** 0.085
lnR&D -0.33 0.076 -1.45
*** 0.045
R&D / SALES * 100 4.35 0.241 2.44
*** 0.081
lnIE 0.27 0.072 -0.62
*** 0.042
IE / SALES * 100 6.39 0.280 4.61
*** 0.143
*** (**, *) denote a significant mean difference in a two-sided t-test at the level of 1% (5%, 10%). The distribution of
observations across industries varies before the matching.